Former Nigerian Attorney-General and Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami celebrated Christmas and New Year while incarcerated.
If you're tracking progress, this implies that by the time his bond request is considered by the Federal High Court in Abuja on Wednesday, Malami will have been deprived of his freedom and confidence for more than a month.
Only two years prior, this scenario seemed impossible. For eight years, he served as Nigeria's top-ranking government figure. No, not President Muhammadu Buhari. Nor Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo.
Those individuals were the official leaders, naturally, and furthermore, Osinbajo was the more skilled attorney. However, Malami had a strong connection to Buhari through their shared faith and Fulani background in a government where communication did not occur in English.
But currently, Buhari has passed away, and Malami is dealing with allegations of money laundering in a nation where he previously characterized money laundering as well as nearly all other offenses.
Nigeria has seen numerous Attorneys-General who were politically aligned and some who failed to perform effectively. However, the nation hasn’t thoroughly addressed—particularly not through a consistent, fact-based story—the idea that Malami's time as AGF might have been even more concerning: transforming the Justice Ministry into a strategic tool, with authority over directing inquiries, determining which legal cases proceeded or were dropped, handling major settlements, overseeing the management of seized property, and establishing guidelines for dealing with confiscated assets.
Latest news reports, including in Premium Times and The Cable Listing 41 assets that Malami is accused of possessing in Kebbi, Kano, and Abuja, worth more than N212 billion, thus cannot be considered "just another case of graft."
Instead, it is a potential capstone exhibit in a much larger case that has yet to be made: the case that Malami’s public record is best understood not as a series of scattered controversies or isolated reports, but as a coherent pattern of power, discretion, opacity and personal accumulation.
At first glance, the roster of major assets is impressive. However, the more compelling, yet unexpressed case is this: the real issue isn't just the quantity of properties or the high-profile value; it's the systemic structure that allowed such concentration to happen, along with the broader policy failures resulting from an AGF acting as a gatekeeper, at times hindering rather than supporting the anti-corruption framework.
A genuine nation does not view this as mere rumor or political tooling; instead, it sees it as an examination of the honesty of governmental authority.
For eight years during his tenure as "The Law," Malami faced constant and repeated accusations and scandals.
In 2020, non-governmental organizations officially petitioned The presidency launched an investigation against him, citing "14 prominent corruption charges." Malami probably chuckled; after all, he was part of the presidency!
SaharaReporters released the coalition's letter, outlining accusations spanning from backdoor dealings to fiscal misconduct. Regardless of individual opinions about each claim, the fact that consistent, structured grievances have been raised over several years is significant—it suggests ongoing issues rather than an isolated mistake.
It's paradoxical that the same authority which Malami dismantled due to his ability is now poised to bring charges against him.
Next comes the "assets" issue, possibly the most ethically damaging aspect for any AGF.
During Buhari's leadership, the anti-corruption initiative placed significant emphasis on recovering assets. However, the general population has consistently criticized the lack of transparency, poor financial management, and ambiguous guidelines regarding the handling of seized funds and confiscated properties.
Within that disputed and crowded area entered the AGF's office, the organization capable of developing standards, supervising procedures, and most importantly, deciding who has access to what.
Recent reporting signals that a Federal High Court in Lagos declared Malami's asset management guidelines unlawful, an significant institutional development since it portrays the AGF not just as an overseer, but as a policy creator whose regulations have influence.
Recall, in this regard, that in November 2020, Malami led a presidential panel to get rid of all seized property within six months.
This kind of committee is not standard administrative procedure; it is among the simplest venues where collusive activities, underpricing, and insider trading can conceal themselves behind "due process."
I kept questioning that presidential order since it touched upon the core issue with Malami: that having authority without complete openness leads to corruption. It seemed as though Malami showed little regard for being held responsible.
A second key element of the "most compelling argument so far" relates to Nigeria's significant international legal conflicts and resolutions, where the Attorney General's Office (AGF) has the potential to impact the nation financially through both actions and omissions. The P&ID matter, regardless of all involved parties, serves as a prime example: documents from British courts indicate that President Buhari instructed Malami in 2018 to restart discussions for settling the dispute with P&ID.
Courts and Tribunals Judiciary Reporting and court discussions regarding the issue further highlight Malami's key role in Nigeria's position during the conflict.
The main idea is not to revisit each strategic choice, but to emphasize that when an AGF consistently appears at locations involving (a) vast sums of money, (b) significant confidentiality, and (c) claims of self-interest emerge afterward, the nation should review the entire situation as a single instance of poor governance, rather than individual incidents.
That takes us back to the Malami property list . In isolation, it is striking. When considered within the broader picture, it turns revealing: it implies an individual who exited their role having accumulated assets that were exceptionally large, spread across various locations and industries, necessitating an account commensurate with the influence they once held.
The issue of public concern goes beyond simply asking, "Where did the funds originate?" Instead, it raises these questions: which choices, authorizations, failures to act, agreements, rules, and interactions between agencies occurred alongside this buildup? Were any conflicts of interest disclosed or hidden?
Which intermediaries or company structures were involved? And who gained personally or through others as a result of AGF's influence over legal mechanisms?
The problem in Nigeria lies in how it treats corruption like a performance, addressing each scandal individually instead of recognizing it as systemic control.
A more compelling point regarding Malami is that during his tenure, the Justice Ministry might have served as a central node where three areas intersected: (1) decisions on prosecution (which individuals face charges, delays, or settlements); (2) handling of confiscated assets (what was taken, how they were handled, which ones were sold, and according to what guidelines); and (3) political safeguarding (the use of legal mechanisms to protect supporters and target adversaries).
The allegations supply a vivid “wealth” stream; the coalition petitions supply a “pattern of concern” stream; the asset-sale controversies supply the “process and opacity” stream; and the mega-dispute record supplies the “national-cost” stream.
If Nigeria is serious, the next step is not another round of shouting. It is a structured, public, document-driven case: a timeline of Malami-era decisions; a catalogue of controversies with primary-source links; a forensic asset and beneficial-ownership map; and FOI-driven demands for the paper trails behind forfeiture sales, guideline-making, settlement authorisations and inter-agency directives.
Until that synthesis is done, the country will keep mistaking fragments for the whole.
The most compelling argument remains unproven as Nigeria still needs to clarify how one government position, which holds significant power and lacks openness, could serve as the source of both countrywide losses and personal benefits.
Just like anyone else, Malami is entitled to a just trial. However, can the EFCC present this case in the best interests of the nation?
And will that happen this year? Or perhaps 20 years, in which truths can be discussed?
Supplied by SyndiGate Media Inc. ( Syndigate.info ).
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